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Abstract
The inconsistent empirical link between IT investment and performance has fueled scholarly debate over IT
value.  Using the concept of resources and value creation, coupled with the logic behind Prisoners Dilemma,
this paper theoretically demonstrates that it is not likely that investing firms are the ones who enjoy a
significant portion of value created by their IT investment.  The dynamic interplay among firms, competitors,
and IT suppliers makes it difficult for investing firms to truly realize the value from their IT investment.
Introduction
Scholars have long been in search of information technology (IT) investment value and resulting performance improvement.
Unfortunately, research in IT investment value and performance has produced mixed results, and has evolved into IT paradox
debate (e.g., Brynjolfsson, 1993).  While the research findings at the economy and industry levels have shown little promise of
productivity or value derived from IT investment, researchers have turned their attention to the studies at the firm and application
levels and found more promising results.  Nevertheless, the research on IT and performance at the firm and application levels has
continued to yield inconclusive results (e.g., Devaraj & Kohli, 2000).
The common but implicit assumption that IT investment should create value to investing firms and result in the performance
improvement has driven business managers to heavily invest in IT (Mahmood & Mann, 1993) and has fueled research efforts to
demonstrate the connection between firm performance and IT investment (Thatcher & Oliver, 2001).  This assumption may also
have directed the explanation of mixed results towards methodology-related issues, especially performance measurement (Chan,
2000).  This paper takes the position that both methodology and theory that research rests up on can limit empirical findings.
Many scholars with the IT value assumption strongly held may have mainly argued that the methodological differences have led
to inconclusive findings.  However, I believe that in addition to methodological concerns, there is a need to step back and look
at a bigger theoretical picture of IT investment value in order to understand or to explain why the consistent link between firm
performance and IT investment has not been found empirically.
From practitioner standpoints, considering the massive IT investment worldwide and over $300 billions of annual IT investment
in the U.S. alone (Judge et al., 1998), it is legitimate to call for further understanding on IT investment value.  From academic
standpoints, the ongoing mixed research findings also call for further explanations.  This paper aims to theoretically examine the
potential IT investment value, which investing firms can gain, based on the concept of resources and value creation (Collis &
Montgomery, 1998) and Prisoners Dilemma in game theory (e.g., von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).  Instead of holding on
the common IT value assumption, this paper takes a step back and asks a fundamental question whether IT investment really
creates value to investing firms.  I believe that by removing such assumption, we can gain more theoretical flexibility and can
view the IT investment phenomenon from a broader perspective, which may hopefully yield a better understanding on IT
investment value and resulting firm performance.
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Literature Review
IT Paradox
The waves of the search for IT investment value was initiated at the economy and industry levels, which were particularly centered
on aggregate IT investment and resulting productivity improvement.  However, the research findings have been inconclusive and
have shown little evidence of productivity gains.  For example, Baily (1986) found the decline in productivity at the economy
level in the 1970s when there was a massive IT investment.  Jorgenson and Stiroh (1995) also found the productivity growth in
the 1973-1992 period (extensive IT investment) was less than that in the 1947-1973 period (limited IT investment).  At the
industry level, Siegel and Griliches (1992) found a positive correlation between IT investment and productivity growth in
manufacturing industries while Brendt and Morrison (1995) found no significant differences in productivity associated with IT
investment and other kinds of investment. (see Chan, 2000; Devaraj & Kohli, 2000 for more thorough reviews) 
While the first wave of the search for IT investment value at economy and industry levels has showed discouraging results, the
second wave has taken on at the firm and application levels.  Although the research at the firm and application levels has revealed
more promising findings than the economy- and industry-level research, IT investment-performance research at the firm and
application levels has continued to yield inconclusive results (e.g., Mahmood & Mann, 1993; Thatcher & Oliver, 2001).  For
example, Strassmann (1990) found no relationship between IT investment, productivity, profits and return on investment while
Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1995) found the connection of IT with increased productivity and consumer surplus, but not with higher
profitability.  In addition, Lee and Menon (2000, p. 99) studied IT and non-IT investment in hospitals in the 1976-1994 period
and found that IT labor had a negative contribution to productivity and that non-IT capital had a greater contribution to
productivity than IT capital.  
Since firms and applications are the focus of recent studies, more researchers have made research efforts towards the link between
IT investment and business performance indices/quantitative measures.  Mahmood and Mann (1993) found that individual IT
investment variables were weakly correlated with organizational strategic and economic performance measures.  However, they
found the mixture of positive and negative results from canonical correlation analysis.  The canonical functions suggested that
IT spending on employee training was positively related to sales by total assets, market value to book value, and ROI while IT
budget as a percentage of total revenue was negatively related to that set of performance measures.  In addition, IT value as a
percentage of its revenue was positively related to sales by total assets but negatively related to sales by employee and return on
sales.  Following the same line of research question, Rai and his colleagues (1997) found no relationship between IT investment
and financial performance.  Instead, they found a positive relationship between IT investment and revenues, and at the application
level, they found IT capital and client/server expenditure were positively related to ROA, but IS staff, hardware, software and
telecommunication expenditures were not.  They also found that IT capital, client/server, IS staff, and hardware expenditures were
positively related to labor productivity while IS staff, hardware, software and telecommunication expenditures were negatively
related to administrative productivity.  The positive relationship between IT investment and revenues were also found in Devaraj
and Kohlis (2000) study on the DSS use in the healthcare industry.  Sircar, Turnbow and Bordoloi (2000) replicated the finding
of the revenue-IT investment relationship, but found no relationship between IT investment and profitability measured by net
income.  At the application level, they found that spending on IS staff and staff training were positively related to revenues, even
more so than computer capital.  However, they found no connection to net income.
In short, previous studies at all four levels of analysis have shown inconclusive results.  The findings at the firm and application
levels have been more encouraging than those at the economy and industry levels, and have shown the replication of revenue-IT
investment correlation.  Nevertheless, in most cases, they have failed to show the correlation between profitability and IT
investment.
Performance Measures
Several IT researchers have largely attributed the mixed IT-firm performance research findings to the differences in research
methodology, particularly performance measurement (Brynjolfsson, 1993; Rai et al., 1997).  Chan (2000) has found that perfor-
mance measures in IT investment research have been evenly divided into qualitative/individual (soft) and quantitative/
organizational (hard) measures.  Michalisin, Smith and Kline (1997, p. 379) have suggested that the choice of performance
measures should be a function of ones research.  This paper further argues that the choice of firm performance should reflect
the purpose of business initiatives and organizational goals.  Thus, when for-profit firms, whose IT initiatives appear to be for
strategic/tactical purposes, are the focus of IT investment research, quantitative/organizational measures such as profitability
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should be necessary firm performance indices.  The logic is that profitability is a major organizational goal of for-profit firms and
in many cases is a major driver of their strategic attempts.  Thus, profitability should be a necessary firm performance index
although it may not sufficiently reflect firm performance as a whole, considering a broad range of firms responsibilities for
stakeholders well-beings (i.e., employee/customer satisfaction).  In addition, from business practitioner perspectives, massive
IT spending, accounted for up to 50% of businesses total capital expenditures (Earl, 1989), can directly undermine firm
profitability; thus, expected benefits of IT investment should somewhat be linked to firm profitability as well especially when the
firms are profit-oriented.  The scenario would be different for non-profit firms in which, by definition, profitability is not a major
concern.  Performance indices of non-profit firms could legitimately be qualitative/individual measures (i.e., employee/customer
satisfaction).  
Nevertheless, this paper focuses mainly on for-profit firms and is an attempt to theoretically examine the potential IT investment
value and resulting firm performance improvement, which investing firms can gain, based on the concept of resources and value
creation (Collis & Montgomery, 1998) and Prisoners Dilemma (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).  It is noted that this paper
still encourages the firm level of analysis and quantitative/organizational (hard) performance measures although recent studies
have moved toward the application level and qualitative/individual (soft) performance measures, a more micro level of analysis,
to search for stronger IT investment-performance connections.
Resources and Value Creation
Whether a firms resources can create value to the firm depends on the dynamic interplay between the firm and its competitive
environment particularly in the dimensions of demand, scarcity and appropriability (Collis & Montgomery, 1998).  The
intersection of these three dimensions is labeled the value creation zone (see Figure 1).  In other words, resources can create
value to the firm when they meet these three criteria: demand, scarcity and appropriability simultaneously.
Figure 1. The Value Creation Zone (from Collis & Montgomery, 1998)
A firms resources meet the demand criterion when one or more properties of the resources can help the firm to fulfill customers
needs at a price that customers are still willing to pay.  It is noted that customers needs and willingness to pay can change over
time and are contingent on environmental changes (e.g., Collis & Montgomery, 1998).  Scholars in the resource-based view
(RBV) school of thought in the strategy field also describe this kind of resources as valuable resources (e.g., Barney, 1991).  To
meet the second criterion, scarcity, a firms resources should not be plentifully available or easy for competitors to replicate.  RBV
scholars refer this characteristic to rareness, imperfect imitability, and non-substitutability (e.g., Barney, 1991).  The final criterion,
appropriability, is about the distribution of value: Who captures the value created by the resources? (Collis & Montgomery,
1998, p. 37)  Put differently, it is the issue of whether revenues or profits generated by a firms resources will eventually go to
the firm or will be distributed to other parties.  For example, revenues or profits made by a firms salespeople may not entirely
go to the firm, and may be partly distributed to the salespeople in the forms of salaries and commissions.  In the extreme, if the
salespeoples salaries and commissions become very high, the net revenues or net profits that the firm can appropriate may turn
to be marginal although the salespeople are probably considered valuable human resources of the firm.  To my knowledge, the
issue of appropriability has not gained much research attention from RBV and strategy scholars, despite its important implications.
In sum, the value creation zone framework proposed by Collis and Montgomery (1998) can provide us an analytical lens to
determine whether a firms resources can create value to the firm.  A firms resources can create value to the firm when they
simultaneously meet the three criteria: demand, scarcity, and appropriability.
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Prisoners Dilemma
In game theory literature, Prisoners Dilemma has been a very well-known example to demonstrate that under some
circumstances, rational actors acting in their own best interest and assuming others to do so can end up with the worst possible
outcomes for all (e.g., von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).  In the Prisoners Dilemma, police apprehend two individuals on
suspicion of committing a serious crime.  The police do not have enough evidence to convict on serious charges, but have enough
evidence to convict on a charge for a three-year prison term.  The police make an offer to one individual a one-year sentence if
he confesses.  If he does not confess and his partner does, the charge will be more serious and will carry a ten-year prison term.
However, if both confess, each individual will receive a seven-year sentence.  While both individuals are kept apart, one has to
make the decision based on the expected behavior of the other.  As rational actors assuming the other will act in his own best
interest, they both confess and receive a seven-year sentence although the better outcomes for both could have been a three-year
sentence if they had turned down the polices offer.  The payoff matrix of the Prisoners Dilemma is shown as follows.
Individual 2
Confess Does not confess
Confess 7 - 7 1 - 10
Individual 1 Does not
confess 10 - 1 3 - 3
Note:  In each cell, the left is the year prison term for Individual 1 while
the right one is the year prison term for Individual 2
Figure 2.  Prisoners Dilemma Payoff Matrix 
In short, the Prisoners Dilemma demonstrates a counter-intuition of rational decisions leading to negative outcomes.  We can
draw an analogy between the Prisoners Dilemma and some business situations where firms acting in their own best interest and
assuming others to do so can bring destructive outcomes to all. 
Theoretical Arguments, Analyses, and Propositions
Resources, Value Creation, and IT Investment
Several management scholars regard IT as a type of firm resource (e.g., Mata, Fuerst & Barney, 1995).  The value creation zone
framework can be used as an analytical lens to see whether IT resources can create value to the firm, based on the three criteria:
demand, scarcity, and appropriability.  The analyses are as follows. 
Demand Criterion 
The advancement in IT has offered firms new ways to do businesses and to fulfill customers needs in various industry sectors
(e.g., Rayport & Sviokla, 1995).  IT provides firms with various capabilities of managing information pertaining to business
operations such as inventory, quality control, purchasing, and decision making, and hence can help firms to cope with business
and customer demands (Turban et al., 1996).  Yet, the information technology advancement itself may have escalated the
expectations of customers.  As the IT advancement escalates the customer expectations, investing in IT may increase the
possibility that the firms can meet business and customer demands.  The above discussion suggests Proposition 1, which indicates
that IT investment is likely to meet the demand criterion of the value creation zone framework.
Proposition 1: IT investment is positively associated with the likelihood that investing firms can meet business and
customer demands.
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Scarcity Criterion
As the rate of IT advancement becomes so rapid and results in technological obsolescence (Yang & Huang, 2000), the trend that
firms make IT investment through outsourcing become more prevalent (Slaughter & Ang, 1996).  By doing so, firms can have
an access to the best in class IT and specialized knowledge, and can reduce the risk of being locked in the obsolete technology.
In other words, external IT specialists or IT vendors can help the firms to keep up with the pace of IT advancement, which is
generally set by the IT specialist companies themselves.  Although firms can have an access to the best in class IT and the
specialized knowledge through outsourcing, so can their competitors.  As rational actors, IT suppliers are ready to sell their
products/services to any firm with a sufficient spending capacity.  Thus, the best in class IT and specialized knowledge are always
plentifully available in the market.  Also, by having IT suppliers as outsiders to the firms, the coordination between the two parties
may be diminished.  Consequently, the firms IT developed by the IT suppliers may be less likely to align with other
organizational elements to create a unique value to the firms, which is relatively difficult to imitate by competitors.  Additionally,
IT suppliers, themselves, could potentially be the agents of technology and/or knowledge diffusion.  These arguments lead to
Proposition 2, indicating that IT investment is not likely to meet the scarcity criterion of the value creation zone framework.
Proposition 2: IT investment through IT suppliers is negatively associated with the IT unique benefits and the
difficulty to replicate by competitors.
Appropriability Criterion 
On the issue of appropriability, a significant portion of IT-created value may be distributed to IT suppliers or IT professionals who
are in charge in developing, introducing, and maintaining IT in firms IT investment.  Researchers have found the positive
relationship between IT investment and firm revenues, but found no consistent link between IT investment and firm profitability
(e.g., Rai et al., 1997).  Rai and his colleagues (1997) have interpreted such finding that IT-created value may be distributed across
organizations or passed on to customers.  It appears that the waves of massive IT investment in the past decade have coincided
with the significant growth of IT-specialist companies and escalating salaries of IT professionals.  Through inductive reasoning,
this observation, coupled with the research findings of positive IT investment-revenue relationship and inconsistent IT investment-
profitability link, may suggest that IT suppliers have appropriated a significant proportion of IT-created value.  The IT-investing
firms can only appropriate a relatively marginal proportion, which carries no significance to their bottom line.  This argument
suggests Proposition 3, indicating that IT investment is not likely to meet the appropriability criterion of the value creation zone
framework.
Proposition 3: IT investment through IT suppliers is negatively associated with the proportion of IT investment value
appropriated by investing firms.
Collectively, Proposition 1, 2 and 3 indicate that IT investment is not likely to meet the three criteria: demand, scarcity and
appropriability simultaneously and thus is not likely to create value to investing firms.
Prisoners Dilemma and IT Battles
Considering the potential that IT can change the way firms do businesses, practitioners and management scholars tend to believe
that IT can evolve into a source of competitive advantage (e.g., Mahmood & Mann, 1993).  From the research findings of the
positive revenue-IT investment relationship, it is reasonable to assume that IT investment can reap a certain amount of financial
value, but how much IT investing firms get their share is still questionable.  
As mentioned earlier, the Prisoners Dilemma can be a useful analogy to some business situations.  IT investment payoffs can
potentially be one of them.  In this analysis, we can set a simple situation that an IT investment plan is offered to a firm by an
external IT supplier.  This IT investment plan can yield an increase of $1,000 in annual net gains ($400 from new sales, $100 from
overhead savings and $500 from sales taken away from a major competitor) as well as an improvement of market recognition from
investing in the advanced IT.  The cost of this IT investment is $350 paid to the IT supplier.  If the firm does not accept the offer
and its major competitor does, the firm may experience sale losses of $500 to its competitor in addition to a relatively poor
reputation of its technology commitment.  On the other hand, the competitor can increase the net revenues by $650 ($1000 minus
$350) and improve its market recognition from investing in the advanced IT.   However, if both the firm and the competitor accept
this offer, they both will not lose or gain $500 from the taken-away sales, and can gain new sales of $200 ($400 split by two) and
overhead savings of $100.  No one gains an advantage over the other from the technology-driven market recognition.  As a result,
they will end up experiencing a loss of $50 each ($300 minus $350) this year from the IT plan.  By next year, they can expect
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another new gain of $200 in sales and overhead savings of $100 (total of $300), which can cover the loss of $50 in the previous
year.  Thus, they can expect the net gain of $250 ($300 minus $50) for the IT investment plan over the two-year period.  As
rational actors, both the firm and the competitor accept the offer and set to take a loss of $50 this year while expecting the net gain
of $250 from the IT investment over the two-year period.  Unfortunately, in the following year, the IT supplier approaches the
firm and informs the firm that there is a technological change, which can make the IT plan adopted in the previous year become
obsolete.  The new IT plan can help firm to increase its annual net revenues by $1,000: $400 from new sales, $100 from overhead
savings, and $500 from sales taken away from the competitor in addition to an improvement of market recognition.  The cost of
this new IT plan is $350, and so on.  In the end, the IT supplier keeps coming up with a new IT plan every year, and the firm and
the competitor as rational actors make rational decisions but never realize the net gain from their ongoing IT investment.  The
payoff matrices of the firm, the competitor and the IT suppler are presented below.
IT Investment offer IT Battles
Competitor Competitors





-50/ (0) recognition +650/ (+)
recognition High IT Lose Win
Accept -50/ (0) recognition -500/ (-)
recognition employment Lose Lose
Firm 700 350 Firms Double Wins Win





0/ (0) recognition employment Win Draw
350 0 Win Draw
Note:  In each cell, the top is the payoff for the firm(s), the middle is the payoff for the competitor(s), and the
bottom is the payoff for the IT supplier(s).
Figure 3. IT Investment Payoff and IT Battle Outcome Matrices 
Although the above IT investment situation is overly simplistic, it may adequately demonstrate the dynamic interplay among the
firm, its main competitor and the IT supplier.  As rational actors, all three parties want to improve their own payoffs.  Both the
firm and its competitor accept the IT investment plan on the basis of preventing their potential sales loss and reaping their net gain
in future years, assuming other things being constant.  Whereas, the IT supplier tries to improve its own payoffs by introducing
new technology and new IT plans to both the firm and its competitor.  Such dynamics make the net gain from IT investment
become difficult to realize by the investing parties.  These arguments suggest the following proposition.
Proposition 4: The IT advancement introduced by IT suppliers and the IT investment launched by competitors are
negatively associated with the likelihood of IT investment value being realized by investing firms.
Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper uses the value creation zone framework and the logic behind the Prisoners Dilemma to analyze the likelihood that
IT investment will create value to investing firms.  The value creation zone framework suggests that IT investment is not likely
to meet the three criteria: demand, scarcity and appropriability simultaneously (Proposition 1-3). IT investment is likely to meet
the demand criterion.  However, it is not likely to meet the scarcity and appropriability criteria, considering the advanced IT of
IT suppliers also available to competitors, the potential technology/knowledge diffusion through IT suppliers, and the high cost
of IT investment as well as ongoing update/long-term training paid to the IT suppliers.  Thus, it is not likely that IT investment
will create value to investing firms.  From the analysis based on the logic of Prisoners Dilemma, IT investment appears to be a
vicious circle trapping investing firms and competitors into IT battles while IT suppliers is likely to reap the benefits from the IT
investment.  As rational actors acting in their own best interest and assuming others to do so, firms and competitors will have an
ongoing IT investment and gravitate themselves into a lose-lose situation (see Figure 3) although they both would be better off
not to have the ongoing IT investment in place.  One may ask, does this suggest managers not to invest in IT, or is IT investment
a losing proposition? The managerial implications from the analyses are broader than a yes-no answer.  To ignore the appeals
of IT and its potential to offer new ways to do businesses would be an opportunity cost and would not be a preferable managerial
choice.  The analyses imply that to reap significant benefits from IT investment, firms and competitors may need to cooperate
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rather than compete and assume others will act in their own best interest.  Including IT suppliers into the cooperative efforts may
also increase the promise of success.  However, a challenge may lie at how to get IT suppliers to truly cooperate when they are
in the best position to harvest the benefits from IT battles between firms and competitors. 
In conclusion, two different theoretical analyses in this paper show a convergent result that it is not likely that investing firms are
the ones who enjoy a significant portion of value created by their IT investment.  Despite its attempt to further understand the IT
investment phenomenon, this paper still has some inherent limitations.  For simplicity sake, this paper uses an overly simplistic
IT investment situation in the Prisoners Dilemma analysis to illustrate the dynamic interplay among firms, competitors and IT
suppliers in the IT investment phenomenon.  In reality, there may be many factors complicating the situation and influencing the
payoff scenarios.  In addition, this paper can only highlight the potential problems why IT investment may not create a significant
value to investing firms, and may somewhat reflect the prevalent research findings of inconsistent link between IT investment
and profitability.  However, the solutions proposed in this paper are very limited in a practical sense.  Future research may focus
on various factors that can influence the payoff scenarios and may direct the research efforts toward finding IT investment
solutions capable of providing mutual benefits to all parties involved. 
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